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Regulation D is--or at least should be-the crown
jewel of the Securities and Exchange Commission's
regulatory exemptions from the registration requirements
of the Securities Act of 1933. It offers businesses-
especially businesses with relatively small capital
requirements-fair and efficient access to vital, external
capital.
In this article, I present data derived from deep
samples of recent Form Ds filed with the Commission. The
data show that Regulation D is not working in the way the
Commission intended or in a way that benefits society. The
data reveal that companies attempting to raise relatively
small amounts of capital under Regulation D
overwhelmingly forego the low transaction costs of
offerings under Rule 504 and Rule 505 in favor of meeting
the more onerous (and more expensive) requirements of
Rule 506. Additionally, these companies overwhelmingly
limit their relatively small offerings to accredited investors,
which dramatically reduces the pool ofpotential investors.
This unintended and bad outcome is the result of the
burdens imposed by state blue sky laws and regulations,
and this has to a large degree wrecked the sensible and
balanced approach of the Commission in Regulation D.
Reclaiming Regulation D requires the elimination of
state authority over all Regulation D offerings. State
regulators, however, have proven to be aggressive and
effective in protecting their turf Although the Commission
has the ability-and I believe the duty-to solve this
problem for the benefit of the economy, it has a history of
an unwillingness to take on state regulators, even in
* This Article is reprinted with permission from the author. The Wreck of
Regulation D: The Unintended (and Bad) Outcomes for the SEC's Crown Jewel
Exemptions, 66 Bus. LAW. 919 (2011).
** James and Mary Lassiter Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of
Law. The author is indebted to David M. Cameron and Kimberly Coghill for their
assistance in the preparation of this article.
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instances where state regulations essentially destroy the
Commission's sensible and balanced regime for capital
formation. Congress also could solve the problem by
expanding federal preemption to cover all offerings made
under Regulation D.
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1982, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC or
Commission) adopted Regulation D, 1 which offered businesses, especially
small businesses, attractive exemptions from the registration requirements
of the Securities Act of 1933 (Securities Act). These exemptions were
carefully crafted by the Commission and informed by the considerable
experience the Commission had acquired in connection with its earlier,
somewhat problematic rules-Rule 240,2 Rule 2423 and Rule 146.4
The Commission's experience with those prior rules and some not so
gentle nudging by commentators 5 seemingly convinced the Commission
that sensible and successful exemptions from the registration requirements
of the Securities Act must strike an acceptable balance between investor
protection and capital formation.6 Regulation D adopted this idea.
1 See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (2012). The rules were adopted in Revisions of
Certain Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers
and Sales, Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11251 (Mar. 16, 1982)
(codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230, 239). Regulation D now consists of Rules 501
through 508. Rules 501 through 503 and Rules 507 through 508 are general rules of
support for the exemptions found in Rules 504 through 506.
2 17 C.F.R. § 230.240 (1981). Rule 240 provided an exemption from registration
under section 3(b) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b) (2006), for
offerings of up to $100,000.
' 17 C.F.R. § 230.242. Rule 242 provided an exemption from registration under
section 3(b) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b), for offerings of up to two
million dollars.
4 17 C.F.R. § 230.146. Rule 146 provided an exemption from registration under
section 4(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77d(2), for offerings unlimited in
amount.
5 See, e.g., Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers Under the
Securities Act of 1933: Practical Foreclosure from the Capital Market, 1977 DUKE
L.J. 1139 (1978) (describing the ambiguity of Rule 146, the problems created by
the integration provisions of that rule and the difficulty of reselling securities
acquired in offerings exempt under Rule 146).
6 Former Rule 146 was especially unbalanced in this regard. Id. at 1143-57. Later,
Congress specifically instructed the Commission regarding the obligation to
balance investor protection and capital formation. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) ("the
Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether
the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation").
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With regard to investor protection, Regulation D was based on the
correct assumption that the two most potent protections for investors are
their own sophistication-their ability to evaluate the merits and risks of
any offering of securities-and the meaningful disclosure of or access to
material investment information.7 With regard to capital formation,
Regulation D was based on the correct assumptions that transaction costs
(offering costs) can throttle capital formation and that it is relative, not
absolute, offering costs that are important in that regard .
Regulation D, therefore, offered issuers a stair-step approach through
its three exemptions-Rule 504, Rule 505 and Rule 506-requiring more
investor protections as the size of the offering increased. The apparent
reckoning of the Commission was that the investor protection devices-
disclosure and sophistication requirements-generate significant
transaction costs for issuers, and since relative rather than absolute
transaction costs choke off capital formation, a sensible balance between
capital formation and investor protection leads to the imposition of
additional investor protection requirements as deals get larger.
Accordingly, Rule 504 provides an exemption from registration for
offerings up to one million dollars9 without any purchaser sophistication
requirement or disclosure requirement. 10 Rule 505, which provides an
exemption for offerings up to five million dollars, requires the issuer in
most cases to disclose investment information to the purchasers. 1 Rule 506,
which provides an exemption without any amount limitation, requires the
issuer in most cases to make even more extensive disclosures of investment
information 12 and generally limits purchasers to sophisticated or accredited
investors.13
The Commission deserves high praise for its enactment of Regulation
D. Even if one is unsure that each balance struck by the Commission in
Regulation D was precisely correct, the underlying theory was sensible, and
7 See infra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
8id.
9 As originally enacted, Rule 504 offered an exemption for offerings up to
$500,000. See 17
C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2)(i) (1983).
10 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504(b)(iii)(2), 230.502(b)(1) (2012).
"' Id. §§ 230.505, 230.502(b)(1). Rule 505, however, does not require disclosure of
investment information in the case of sales to accredited investors. id.
§ 230.502(b)(1).
12 Id. § 230.506. Rule 506, however, does not require disclosure of investment
information in the case of sales to accredited investors. Id. § 230.502(b)(1).
13 Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
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the regulation amounts to a good-faith and generally sound application of
that theory by an experienced and respected regulatory agency.
14
A number of events or circumstances since 1982, however, have
reshaped the environment in which Regulation D operates and as a result,
have to a large extent wrecked Regulation D. Data demonstrate that small
issuers raising small amounts of capital now overwhelmingly abandon Rule
504 and Rule 505. Offerings of securities eligible to use those exemptions
are now by a very large majority made under Rule 506 and limited to
accredited investors."
This unintended outcome is the result of state securities laws,
specifically states' registration requirements in their blue sky laws.
16
In 1996, Congress enacted the National Securities Markets
Improvement Act 17 (NSMIA), which preempted state authority over the
registration of securities offered under Rule 506.18 NSMIA did not,
however, preempt state authority over offerings made under Rule 504 and
Rule 505.' 9 It is this distinction regarding preemption of state blue sky laws
that causes issuers to abandon Rule 504 and Rule 505 and restructure these
14 See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The Plight of Small Issuers (and Others) Under
Regulation D: Those Nagging Problems that Need Attention, 74 KY. L.J. 127, 135
(1985) ("The problem with Regulation D... is not the underlying fundamental
philosophy of the rules, but, instead, is the implementation of that philosophy.").
15 Regulation D defines "accredited investor" to include both "[a]ny natural person
whose individual net worth, or joint net worth with that person's spouse, at the time
of his purchase exceeds $1,000,000" and "[a]ny natural person who had an
individual income in excess of $200,000 in each of the two most recent years or
joint income with that person's spouse in excess of $300,000 in each of those years
and has a reasonable expectation of reaching the same income level in the current
year." 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501(a)(5), (a)(6). The net worth test for an accredited
investor was recently amended to exclude the value of the investor's primary
residence. See infra note 105 and accompanying text.
16 These state laws and the regulations enacted thereunder require issuers offering
their securities in a particular state either to register the securities with the state's
division of securities or to meet the requirements for an exemption from the
particular state's registration requirement. See, e.g., UNIF. SEC. ACT § 301, 7C
U.L.A. 74 (2002) ("It is unlawful for any person to offer or sell any securities in
this state unless (1) the security is a federal covered security (2) the security,
transaction, or offer is exempted from registration under Section 201 through 203
(3) the security is registered under this [Act].").
17 National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110
Stat. 3416 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
'8 15 U.S.C. §§ 77r(a)(1)(A), (b)(4)(D) (2006) (amended 2012).
19 Rule 504 and Rule 505 are enacted under section 3(b) of the Securities Act. See
17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504(a), 230.505(a) (2012). Securities offered under exemptions
enacted under section 3(b) are not "covered securities" and thus not subject to
preemption. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b).
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small offerings as compliant with Rule 506 and limited to accredited
investors.
In short, state blue sky laws have wrecked the sensible, balanced and
efficient regime that the Commission enacted in Regulation D. What is
interesting and, indeed, unfortunate for small issuers and the economy
generally is that the Commission, which acted so appropriately in the
construction of Regulation D, has without even a whimper of protest
permitted the beneficial effects of Regulation D to be largely neutralized in
this manner, making it more difficult for issuers, especially small issuers, to
find the capital they need to do business.
In this article I offer data demonstrating the evolution of Regulation D
into a regime that the Commission neither intended nor anticipated. The
data, taken from deep samples of recent Form D filings, show that issuers
relying on the exemptions provided by Regulation D, no matter the size of
their offering, overwhelmingly offer their securities pursuant to the terms of
Rule 506 and limit their offering to accredited investors. The data
demonstrate the marginalization of Rule 504 and Rule 505 and the
consequent destruction of the fundamental regime originally constructed by
the Commission in Regulation D.
This is, I argue, an unintended outcome and, even more importantly, a
bad outcome. Small businesses are a vital part of our national economy and
face formidable structural and economic obstacles when they search for
external capital. It is unfair and bad national policy to allow state blue sky
laws effectively to foreclose or significantly limit these businesses and
entrepreneurs from efficient access to external capital. Indeed, such an
outcome is also inconsistent with the articulated congressional preference
for capital formation rules that sensibly balance investor protection and
capital formation.20
To reclaim Regulation D, the Commission must more closely monitor
the vast data available to them in Form Ds filed by issuers utilizing
Regulation D. Such oversight is essential if sensible adjustments in the
regulation are to be made as conditions change. The Commission must also
have the courage to take the affirmative action to neutralize the pernicious
effects on Regulation D caused by state blue sky laws.
20 As a part of NSMIA, Congress specifically ordered the Commission to follow
such a balanced approach in instances when the Commission's delegated authority
to enact rules was to be exercised in furtherance of the "public interest." See 15
U.S.C. § 77b(b) ("Whenever ... the Commission is engaged in rulemaking and is
required to consider or determine whether an action is necessary or appropriate in
the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection
of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation.").
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II. OVERVIEW OF REGULATION D
In 1974, the Commission adopted Rule 14621 and thus began a decade
of regulatory activity regarding what roughly may be called private
placements.22 Rule 146, however, was an inauspicious beginning for the
Commission.2 3 The Rule's requirements were so burdensome and expensive
that the exemption was often practically unavailable, especially for small
offerings by small issuers.24
Responding to the special problems that small businesses had in
meeting the conditions of Rule 146, the Commission in 1975 adopted Rule
240, which offered an exemption from registration to small companies
selling up to $100,000 of their securities.25 Then, in 1978, the Commission
21 Rule 146 was adopted by the Commission in Transactions by an Issuer Deemed
Not to Involve Any Public Offering, Securities Act Release No. 5487, 4 SEC
Docket 154 (Apr. 23, 1974). The rule became effective June 10, 1974.
22 Prior to the adoption of Rule 146, private placements were limited to offerings
under the common law that had developed around section 4(2) of the Securities
Act. Although the exemption provided by section 4(2) of the Securities Act was
widely utilized by issuers prior to the Commission's administrative rules regarding
private offerings, the exemption was widely criticized for its ambiguity. See, e.g.,
Royall Victor, Jr. & Melvin L. Bedrick, Private Offering: Hazards for the Unwary,
45 VA. L. REV. 869, 869 (1959) (characterizing section 4(2) as "probably the most
frequently used of all the exemptions, either consciously or unconsciously"); see
also Edward T. McDermott, The Private Offering Exemption, 59 IOWA L. REV.
525, 549 (1974) (characterizing the exemption as "a tale of growing confusion");
Julian M. Meer, The Private Offering Exemption Under the Federal Securities
Act"A Study in Administrative and Judicial Contraction, 20 Sw. L.J. 503, 534
(1966) (characterizing use of the exemption for non-institutional offerees as "a
hazardous risk").
23 See Homer Kripke, SEC Rule 146: A "Major Blunder, " N.Y. L.J. (July 5, 1974),
at 1, col. 2; Robert A. Kessler, Private Placement Rules 146 and 240-Safe
Harbor?, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 37 (1975); Robert H. Kinderman, Jr., The Private
Offering Exemption: An Examination of Its Availability Under and Outside Rule
146, 30 Bus. LAW. 921 (1975); Ellsworth A. Weinberg & Michael W. McManus,
The Private Placement Exemption Under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1933
Revisited, and Rule 146, 27 BAYLOR L. REv. 201 (1975); H. David Heumann, Is
Rule 146 Too Subjective to Provide the Needed Predictability in Private
Offerings?, 55 NEB. L. REV. 1, 9 (1975).
24 See Campbell, supra note 5, at 1143-57.
25 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.240 (1976). Rule 240 was adopted in Exemption of Certain
Limited Offers and Sales by Closely Held Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 5560,
6 SEC Docket 132 (Jan. 24, 1975). In the adopting release, the Commission stated
that the exemption was for small issuers "where, because of the small size and
limited character of the offering, the public benefits of registration are too remote."
Id. at 132.
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enacted Rule 242,26 which provided an exemption from registration for
offerings up to $500,000. The requirements for a Rule 242 exemption were
more onerous than those of Rule 240, but significantly less burdensome
(and expensive) than the requirements of Rule 146.27
In 1982, the Commission adopted Regulation D.28 The new regulation
amounted to a consolidated and much improved version of those prior three
rules. Roughly, new Rule 504, Rule 505 and Rule 506 replaced,
respectively, old Rule 240, Rule 242 and Rule 146.
Today's Regulation D differs little from the original version of that
regulation adopted in 1982.29 Over the nearly thirty-year history of
Regulation D, the Commission has held to its fundamental underlying
principle of balancing investor protection and capital formation, continuing
to recognize that relatively high transaction costs can choke off valuable
capital formation.
Briefly, today's Rule 504 exemption, which is limited to non-reporting
companies, permits a non-1934 Act company to offer up to one million
dollars in securities in a twelve-month period.30 There are no disclosure
requirements or offeree or purchaser qualification requirements. The Rule
imposes no limitation on the number of purchasers that may acquire
securities in a Rule 504 offering. The issuer is prohibited from engaging in
26 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.242 (1980). Rule 242 was adopted in Exemption of Limited
Offers and Sales by Qualified Issuers, Securities Act Release No. 6180, 19 SEC
Docket 295 (Jan. 17, 1980).
27 For example, unlike the requirements of Rule 240, the exemption provided by
Rule 242 required disclosure of investment information (in addition to other
requirements). 17 C.F.R. § 230.242(c)-(h) (1979).
28 Today's version of Regulation D is found at 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501-.508 (2012).
In early 1978, the Commission announced the hearings that led to the adoption of
Regulation D. Securities Act Release No. 5914, 43 Fed. Reg. 10,876 (Mar. 15,
1978). Regulation D became effective on April 15, 1982. See Revision of Certain
Exemptions from Registration for Transactions Involving Limited Offers and Sales,
Securities Act Release No. 6389, 47 Fed. Reg. 11251, 11251 (Mar. 16, 1982).
29 There are, of course, some differences. For example, as originally adopted, Rule
504 provided an exemption only for offerings of up to $500,000, while today that
limit has been raised to one million dollars. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2)(i)
(1983), with 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2)(i) (2012). Also, for example, as originally
adopted, one of the accredited investor standards was based on "individual income
in excess of $200,000," while today that test has been expanded to include a test
based on one's "joint income with that person's spouse in excess of $300,000."
Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(7) (1983), with 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(6) (2012).
Also, the net worth standard for an accredited investor has recently been amended.
See infra note 105 and accompanying text. But, as the following textual discussion
demonstrates, the fundamental requirements and, most certainly, the philosophy of
Regulation D have been unchanged over that period.
30 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (2012).
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any general advertising in connection with the offering and must take steps
to ensure that there is no public resale of the securities for a period of
time.3
Rule 505, which is available to both reporting and non-reporting
companies, offers issuers an exemption for offerings of up to five million
dollars, but it conditions the availability of the exemption on the issuer's
meeting additional conditions, the most significant of which is the
requirement that the issuer, prior to sale, provide each unaccredited
purchaser with a significant amount of closely prescribed narrative and
financial investment information.32 An additional condition in Rule 505, as
compared to Rule 504, is a limit of thirty-five unaccredited purchasers.33
Similar to Rule 504, Rule 505 prohibits any general advertising of the
offering and requires that the issuer take steps to prevent any public resale
of the securities acquired in a Rule 505 offering.
34
Rule 506 is available to reporting and non-reporting companies and
imposes no amount limitation on the issuer's offering.35 Like Rule 505, it
predicates the availability of the exemption on the issuer's supplying a
closely prescribed narrative and financial investment information to all
unaccredited purchasers, and the amount of this information increases as
the size of the offering gets larger.36 Rule 506, however, enhances the
required investor protection, as compared to Rule 505, by requiring that
each purchaser be either sophisticated or accredited.37 Like Rule 505, Rule
506 prohibits general advertising, requires that the issuer take steps to
prevent any public resales of the securities acquired in a Rule 506 offering
and limits the number of unaccredited purchasers to thirty-five.38
To reiterate, the underlying theory of Regulation D-imposing
additional investor protection requirements as transactions get larger-
makes perfect sense as an appropriate balance of the important, competing
policies of promotion of capital formation and investor protection.39
Certainly it was rational at the time of adoption to anticipate that Regulation
D would work as planned-that small offerings would utilize Rule 504, that
somewhat larger offerings would utilize Rule 505 and that the largest
private offerings would utilize Rule 506. Regulation D appeared to offer a
strong incentive for small issuers-and there are literally millions of them
' Id. § 230.504(b)(1).
32 Id. § 230.505(b).
13 Id. § 230.505(b)(2)(ii).
34 Id. § 230.505(b)(2)(iii).
31 See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2012).
36 Id. § 230.506(b)(1).
37 Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
38 Id. § 230.506(b).
39 See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.
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with needs for external capital40 -to flock to Rule 504, with its minimal
requirements and the resulting low transaction costs. For the same
reasons-relatively lower transaction costs-it was rational to assume that
small issuer offerings of one million to five million dollars would utilize
Rule 505 instead of Rule 506. The economic incentives built into
Regulation D seemed certain to ensure that the stepped approach of
Regulation D would work in a manner consistent with the Commission's
obligation to offer exemptions from registration that balance the need for
investor protection with the need to encourage capital formation.
As the next part of this article demonstrates, however, the actual
outcome has been dramatically different from the Commission's intended
outcome and its obligation to promote capital formation with its rules.
III. DATA: THE WRECK OF THE COMMISSION'S REGULATION D
EXEMPTIONS
Data demonstrate the failure of Regulation D to achieve the
Commission's goals, especially the goal of promoting efficient capital
formation for small businesses.
A. The Marginalization of Rule 504 and Rule 505
Tables I through IV, which follow, provide data from approximately
27,000 Form Ds filed between September 15, 2008 and October 18, 2010.
4 1
Data from this deep sample of Form Ds show that Regulation D offerings
overwhelmingly are made under Rule 506. Even offerings of one million
dollars or less---offerings that are suited for Rule 504-are overwhelmingly
made under Rule 506. Similarly, the data show offerings of one million to
five million dollars-offerings that are suited for Rule 505-are also
overwhelmingly made under Rule 506.
Consider first Table I, immediately below, which shows the percentage
and number of Regulation D offerings in our sample that were made under
Rule 504, Rule 505 and Rule 506.
40 See infra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.
41 Regulation D data were obtained from the subscription-only Knowledge Mosaic
website. See Form D Data, KNOWLEDGE MOSAIC, www.knowledgemosaic.com
(last visited Oct. 30, 2012) (follow "Form D" hyperlink; then search "Form D").
Form D filings claiming multiple Regulation D exemptions were not included in
the data reported in this article.
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Table I
Regulation D Regulation D Regulation D
Offerings Under Offerings Under Offerings Under
Rule 504 Rule 505 Rule 506
Percentage 4.4% 1.6% 94.0%
Number 1196/27,234 447/27,234 25,591/27,234
Combined, offerings under Rule 504 and Rule 505 amounted to a mere
6% of all Regulation D offerings, and upon first consideration, this modest
use of Rule 504 and Rule 505 and the overwhelming reliance on Rule 506
seem curious. The data in Table I become even more difficult to understand
in light of the number of small businesses in this country and the need these
firms have for external capital.
Data from the Small Business Administration (SBA),42 for example,
show that there are nearly five million businesses in the United States that
employ fewer than twenty individuals.43 This amounts to almost 90% of the
total business units in the United States.44 SBA data45 also indicate that
nearly 5,500,000 business firms have fewer than one hundred employees,
which amounts to slightly over 98% of the total business units in the United
States.46 It is, of course, these millions of small businesses that were the
intended beneficiaries of the Commission's Rule 504 and Rule 505.
Not surprisingly, the data indicate that these smaller firms require
external capital in order to compete in the marketplaces in which they
42 See, e.g., U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REPORT
OF THE PRESIDENT 1999-2000 (2001) [hereinafter THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS
2000]. Earlier SBA data do not differ materially from later data. See, e.g., U.S.
SMALL Bus. ADMIN., THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS: A REPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT 1994 (1995) [hereinafter THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 1994].
43 THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 42, at 61 tbl.A.4 (in 1998,
4,988,367 firms in America had fewer than twenty employees).
44 See id. (in 1998, 89.4% of all firms in America had fewer than twenty
employees).
45 Data demonstrating the significance of small business to our economy can also
be found in U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES: 1999, at 545 tbl.861 (119th ed. 1999) (84.6% of all business tax returns
filed for 1980 were filed by entities with less than one million dollars in receipts);
id. at 555 tbl.874 (in 1980, 22.3% of total national payroll came from firms with
fewer than twenty employees, and 47.5% of total national payroll that year came
from firms with fewer than one hundred employees).
46 See THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 42, at 61 tbl.A.4 (in 1998,
firms employing fewer than one hundred employees accounted for 98.3% of all
firms in the United States).
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operate. For example, approximately 90% of small firms rely on external
debt for financing.47
A closer look at the data from our sample of Form Ds, however,
demonstrates that smaller firms are indeed utilizing Regulation D for their
small capital requirements.
Consider in that regard Table II, immediately below, which groups
Regulation D offerings by size. Table II shows both the percentage and
number of Regulation D offerings from our sample that were one million
dollars or less and the percentage and number of Regulation D offerings
that were between one million and five million dollars.
Table II
Regulation D Offerings of Regulation D Offerings of $1
$1 Million or Less Million to $5 Million
Percentage 28.9% 25.9%
Number 7880/27,234 7059/27,234
Table II indicates that approximately 55% of the Regulation D
offerings in our 27,000 sample were for amounts of five million dollars or
less. Offerings of one million dollars or less-offerings that were within the
Rule 504 permissible range-accounted for approximately 29% of the
Regulation D offerings in our sample, and offerings of one million to five
million dollars-offerings that were within the Rule 505 permissible
range-accounted for approximately 26% of the Regulation D offerings in
our sample.
Tables III and IV reconcile what appear to be inconsistent data from
Tables I and II, demonstrating that issuers offering securities under
Regulation D in the permissible ranges of Rule 504 and Rule 505
overwhelmingly effected those offerings under Rule 506.
Table III shows the percentage and number of Regulation D offerings
of one million dollars or less that were made under Rule 504 and Rule 506.
47 See THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 1994, supra note 42, at 167 tbl.5.15 (in
1993, 88.7% of firms with ten to nineteen employees and 91.1% of firms
employing between twenty and ninety-nine persons relied on external credit as a
form of financing).
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Table III
Regulation D Offerings of Regulation D Offerings of
$1 Million or Less Offered $1 Million or Less Offered
Under Rule 504 Under Rule 506
Percentage 14.3% 78.6%
Number 1125/7880 6196/7880
The data in Table III show that small issuers offering small amounts of
securities under Regulation D overwhelmingly abandoned Rule 504, which
is the Regulation D exemption especially formulated by the Commission to
provide fair and efficient access to capital for small businesses. Instead,
these small issuers by a large majority relied on Rule 506, with its more
onerous and expensive offering requirements.
Table IV shows the percentage and number of Regulation D offerings
between one million and five million dollars that were made under Rule
505 and Rule 506.
Table IV
Regulation D Offerings of Regulation D Offerings of $1
$1 Million to $5 Million Million to $5 Million Offered
Offered Under Rule 505 Under Rule 506
Percentage 3.9% 91.9%
Number 276/7059 6487/7059
The data demonstrate, once again, that smaller companies fail to take
advantage of the low transaction costs of Rule 505. As was the case with
offerings of one million dollars or less, these small businesses
overwhelmingly rely on Rule 506, with its more onerous and expensive
offering requirements.
B. Regulation D Offerings Limited to Accredited Investors
Tables V through VIII, which are based on a sample of 1000 Form D
filings made between September 15, 2010 and October 12, 2010,48 show
that Regulation D has largely become an exemption under which offerings
48 A sample of 1000 Regulation D filings was obtained from SEC filings in
September and October of 2010. See Form D Data, KNOWLEDGE MOSAIC,
http://www.knowledgemosaic.com (last visited Oct. 30, 2012) (follow "Form D"
hyperlink; then search "Form D"; then search Filing Date Range beginning on
9/15/2010 and ending on 10/12/2010). The manner in which Knowledge Mosaic
collected and grouped the Form D data regarding accredited investors, Tables V-
VIII, and financial intermediation, Table IX, made it practically impossible to use
the approximately 27,000 sample used in Tables I-IV.
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are made exclusively to accredited investors. Most important for this article
is Table VIII, which shows that issuers offering a small amount of
securities under Regulation D (offerings in amounts that could take
advantage of Rule 504 and Rule 505) are overwhelmingly limiting their
search for external capital to accredited investors.
Table V, immediately below, shows the percentage and number of all
Regulation D offerings in our sample that were made exclusively to
accredited investors.
Table V
Regulation D Offerings Limited to
Accredited Investors
88.5%
885/1000
Percentage
Number
Table VI provides additional information about the Regulation D
offerings in Table V, separating those offerings into offerings made under
Rule 504, Rule 505 and Rule 506.
Table VI
Rule 504
Offerings Limited
to Accredited
Investors
59.3%
35/59
Rule 505
Offerings Limited
to Accredited
Investors
56.5%
13/23
Rule 506
Offerings Limited
to Accredited
Investors
91.2%
837/918
Table VI, however, does not accurately reflect the extent to which small
offerings are limited to accredited investors. This is because, as described
earlier in connection with the data in Table III and Table IV, a large
percentage of the offerings within the range of Rule 504 (one million
dollars or less) and the range of Rule 505 (one million to five million
dollars) are made under Rule 506.
Table VII shows that these smaller offerings made under Rule 506 are
overwhelmingly limited to accredited investors.
Table VII
Offerings of $1 Million or
Less Made Under Rule
506 and Limited to
Accredited Investors
88.3%
203/230
Offerings of $1 Million to $5
Million Made Under Rule
506 and Limited to
Accredited Investors
91.8%
191/208
Percentage
Number
Percentage
Number
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Table VIII combines the information from Tables VI and VII. Table
VIII shows the percentage and number of offerings of one million dollars or
less that were limited to accredited investors and the percentage and
number of offerings of between one million and five million dollars that
were limited to accredited investors.
Table VIII
All Regulation D Offerings All Regulation D Offerings
of $1 Million or Less of $1 Million to $5 Million
Limited to Accredited Limited to Accredited
Investors Investors
Percentage 82.4% 88.3%
Number 238/289 204/231
Table VIII shows most vividly the extent to which small businesses
searching for relatively small amounts of external capital limit their search
to accredited investors only.
C. Financial Intermediation in Regulation D Offerings
Data from our sample of Form Ds provide a final important insight into
the access to external capital by issuers with limited capital needs. The data
demonstrate the difficulty these small offerings face in attracting financial
intermediation-the professional assistance from brokers or underwriters
that issuers need to sell their securities.
Table IX provides information from our sample showing that in a large
majority of cases, issuers raising small amounts of capital under Regulation
D do not use financial intermediation.49
As discussed below,50 the data in Table IX reflect in their own way the
special need that small entrepreneurs have for regulatory rules that
efficiently and fairly facilitate their access to external capital.
49 Table IX does not show data regarding financial intermediation in Regulation D
offerings of more than five million dollars. The author was uncertain about the
reliability of the data taken from the Form Ds on these offerings. Examining the
data suggests that a significant percentage of those offerings were Rule 144A
offerings, in which the purchaser was purchasing from the issuer with the view of
reselling into the institutional market. It was uncertain whether in such
circumstances the issuer was reporting that it paid a commission. Nonetheless,
based on the same sample used for Table VI, 13.8% of Regulation D offerings of
more than five million dollars (62/448) were made with assistance of financial
intermediation.
50 See infra notes 66-67 and accompanying text.
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Table IX
Regulation D Offerings of Regulation D Offerings of $1
$1 Million or Less with Million to $5 Million with
Financial Intermediation Financial Intermediation
Percentage 5.8% 12.7%
Number 18/308 31/244
IV. THE DATA: INTERPRETATIONS, INFERENCES AND CONCLUSIONS
A. The Underuse of Rule 504 and Rule 505: Limiting Offerings to
Accredited Investors
The most obvious interpretation of the data in Part III of this article is
that Regulation D has failed to achieve the Commission's goals of
providing entrepreneurs with relatively small capital requirements and a
balanced and efficient path to external capital. Companies able to meet the
conditions for the exemptions provided by Rule 504 or Rule 505-and
there are millions of them"-overwhelmingly abandon those rules as a
basis for meeting their obligations under the Securities Act. Instead, the
companies elect to comply with the requirements of Rule 506, even though
meeting the conditions of that exemption is more onerous and expensive.
These companies also, once again overwhelmingly, limit their capital
search to accredited investors, who amount to a small fraction of the
population.52
The data for offerings of one million dollars or less (offerings that
should fit under Rule 504) show that 78.6% are made under Rule 506, and
82.4% are limited to accredited investors. For offerings of between one
million and five million dollars (offerings that should fit under Rule 505),
data show that 91.9% of those offerings are made under Rule 506, and
88.3% of those offerings are limited to accredited investors.
B. Why Companies Abandon Rule 504 and Rule 505 and Limit
Offerings to Accredited Investors
Typically, companies eligible to use Rule 504 and Rule 505 face tough
circumstances when they seek external capital. As a result of their size and
51 See supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text.
52 For example, data from the Internal Revenue Service show that in 2007 only
3.172% of all tax returns reported an annual adjusted gross income of $200,000 or
more. See Justin Bryan, High-Income Tax Returns for 2007, STAT. INCOME BULL.,
Spring 2010, at 4.
302 OHIO STATE ENTREPRENEURIAL Vol. 7.2
BUSINESS LA WJOURNAL
the small amounts of capital they seek to raise, their offerings are difficult
and expensive.53 Financial intermediation is likely to be unavailable,54 and
relative transaction costs for these companies are high. 55 Why, then, would
such companies opt out of the benefits of what appear to be lower
transaction costs associated with an offering under Rule 504 or Rule 505 in
favor of the apparently higher transaction costs associated with offerings
under Rule 506? And further, why would such companies significantly
limit the pool of potential investors by offering only to accredited
investors?
The most obvious explanation is that altering the terms and techniques
of the offerings in order to meet the requirements of Rule 506 and limiting
the offerings to accredited investors solve the issuers' state securities
problems.
Imagine, for example, a small company that proposes to raise one
million dollars by offering its securities in three states. Meeting the
requirements of Rule 504 is rather simple in that case. Essentially the rule
only requires that the issuer engage in no general advertising and restrict the
resale of its securities that are acquired in the Rule 504 offering.56 The
issuer, however, must also meet the registration requirements in each of the
three states in which it offers its securities. Thus the issuer faces three
additional, distinct sets of rules respecting the offering of its securities. It
also faces the residual risk that it might inadvertently fail to meet the
requirements of one of the states, generating significant potential liability.
One way to meet its burdens under state laws is for our issuer to
restructure the offering under Rule 506, since NSMIA preempted state
authority over Rule 506 offerings.57
53 See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Regulation A: Small Businesses' Search for "A
Moderate Capital," 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 88-90 (2006) (describing structural
and economic impediments to small business capital formation).
54 See supra Table IX.
55 See Campbell, supra note 53, at 89 (describing why offering expenses for small
businesses are "very high").
56 Rule 504 incorporates by reference only sections (a), (c) and (d) of Rule 502. See
17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2012); see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(a), (c)-(d). Section (a) of
Rule 502 offers a safe harbor from integration; (c) prohibits general advertising;
and (d) imposes restrictions on the resale of securities taken in a Rule 504 offering.
Id. Recent amendments to the resale provisions of Rule 144 shortened the holding
period for shares taken under Regulation D to six months or one year, depending
on the circumstances. 17 C.F.R. § 230.144(d)(1)(i)-(ii); see also Rutheford B
Campbell, Jr., Resales of Securities: The New Rules and the New Approach of the
SEC, 37 SEC. REG. L.J. 317, 325-27 (2009) (discussing resales under the recently
amended Rule 144 for shares acquired under Regulation D).
57 Section 18 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2006) (amended 2012)
(preempting state authority over offerings of "covered securities," which term
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Moving to Rule 506, however, generates additional burdens on the
issuer. Most important, under Rule 506 the issuer is generally required to
provide prescribed disclosures to purchasers, ensure that sales are made
only to qualified investors and limit its sales to thirty-five purchasers.58
These requirements significantly complicate a Rule 506 offering and raise
transaction costs for issuers.
All three of these additional requirements, however, are met if the
offering is limited to accredited investors. Rule 506 imposes no disclosure
in connection with sales to accredited investors.59 The purchaser
qualification requirements of the rule are met if purchasers are accredited
investors,60 and there is no limit on the number of accredited investors
under Rule 506.61
These are the reasons that roughly 80% of all offerings in the size range
that would qualify for Rule 504 or Rule 505 are made under Rule 506 and
limited to accredited investors.62
Issuers rationally conclude that an offering under Rule 506 limited to
accredited investors involves lower transaction costs than offerings under
Rule 504 and Rule 505, which are required to meet the registration
provisions under each state's blue sky laws.
C. Pernicious Effects
The effective loss of, or material limitation on, the availability of Rules
504 and 505 is pernicious. Although the harm falls most directly on small
businesses, the economy as a whole loses when small businesses are limited
in their access to external capital.
Small businesses are a vital part of our national economy. Data
available from the Small Business Administration show, for example, that
approximately 18% of all employment in the United States is provided by
firms with fewer than twenty employees, 63 and approximately 36% of
includes securities offered in transactions exempt under "Commission rules or
regulations issued under [section 4(2)]" of the Securities Act).
58 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.506(b)(2), 230.502 (2012).
59Id. § 230.502(b)(1).6 1 Id. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
61 Id. § 230.501(e)(1)(iv).
62 See supra Tables III, IV, VII & VIII.
63 See U.S. SMALL Bus. ADMIN., THE SMALL BUSINESS ECONOMY: A REPORT To
THE PRESIDENT 2004, 178 tbl.A.5 (2004) [hereinafter THE STATE OF SMALL
BUSINESS 2004] (in 2001, 17.9% of all employment was provided by firms with
fewer than twenty employees); see also THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 2000,
supra note 42, at 61 tbl.A.4 (in 1998, 18.8% of all employment was provided by
firms with fewer than twenty employees).
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employment is provided by firms with fewer than one hundred employees.
64
Thoughtful commentary has opined that even these numbers understate the
importance of small businesses to the vitality of our national economy.
65
In securing essential external capital,66 small businesses face significant
impediments. First are the structural or marketplace impediments. No-or
very limited-financial intermediation is available for small offerings.
Consider the data in Table IX, for example, showing that only 5.8% of all
offerings of one million dollars or less are made through brokers or other
financial intermediaries. The reason for this is that small deals by
unseasoned issuers generate expenses that swamp the value created by the
transactions. Brokers representing small deals face the costs of learning the
deal, effecting the necessary offers and sales, and absorbing the residual
legal risks. Small offerings cannot support such expenses.
The absence of financial intermediation puts these smaller companies at
a significant disadvantage. The issuers, one might assume, are efficient in
their own business (e.g., making widgets) but not in selling securities. They
maintain no professional staff with the necessary skills to raise capital by
selling securities. Professors Gilson and Kraakman have written
thoughtfully regarding the importance and efficiencies of financial
intermediation.67
In addition, small businesses' access to external capital is significantly
impeded by state and federal regulatory schemes that discriminate against
small entrepreneurs. Considered together, federal and state laws and
regulations leave small entrepreneurs with extremely limited options
regarding capital formation activities.
In other articles, I have attempted to demonstrate the limited legal
options available to small issuers.68 Briefly stated, high offering costs
69
64 See THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 2004, supra note 63, at 178 tbl.A.5 (firms of
this size in 2001 provided work for 35.6% of all employees). In 1998, these firms
provided employment for 36.7% of all employees. THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS
2000, supra note 42, at 61 tbl.A.4.
65 See Campbell, supra note 53, at 85-86 (providing data and commentary from
others regarding job creation and innovation by small businesses and minority
ownership of small businesses).
66 See id at 87-89 (providing data and offering explanations for why traditional
debt financing is attractive to small businesses).
67 Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency,
70 VA. L. REv. 549, 613-21 (1984).
68 Campbell, supra note 5; Campbell, supra note 14; Campbell, supra note 53, at
100-12.
69 See, e.g., JAMES D. Cox ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES AND
MATERIALS 156 (6th ed. 2009) (reporting that "estimated 2007 costs for a
significant IPO [include] ... $600,000-$800,000 in fees to counsel, $500,000-
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generally prevent small issuers from raising their external capital through
registered offerings of their securities. 70 Regulation A offerings have fallen
into nearly total disuse,7' due principally to the impact of state blue sky
laws.72 Offerings under section 4(2)7' are limited to sophisticated offerees
and purchasers 74 and apparently require access to or disclosure 75 of the
same information that would be required in a registration statement.76 The
costs of meeting these conditions for the section 4(2) exemption and,
importantly, the residual risk that an offering may not meet these nebulous
requirements make section 4(2) offerings generally unattractive or
unworkable for small issuers seeking external capital. Finally, offerings
under the intrastate exemption provided by Rule 14777 are restricted to a
single state,78 which inhibits any broad search for capital. Although within
the single state, federal rules permit an issuer relying on Rule 147 to solicit
broadly for investors,79 coordinating an intrastate offering with state blue
$600,000 for the auditor, underwriter commission of typically 7 percent ....
$150,000-$200,000 in printing costs").
70 See Campbell, supra note 53, at 91-92. SBA data report that between 1988 and
1997, the number of IPOs by small business in those years varied between 83 and
304. In one year, 1999, there were, for example, 101 registered offerings by small
businesses. THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 2000, supra note 42, at 27 tbl. 1.10.
71 See Campbell, supra note 53, at 83 ("from 1995 through 2004" the Commission
received an average of "only about eight Regulation A filings per year").
7Id. at 106-10.
73 For a good explanation of the common law of section 4(2), see COMM. ON FED.
REGULATION OF SEC., ABA SECTION OF Bus. LAW, LAW OF PRIVATE PLACEMENTS
(NON-PUBLIC OFFERINGS) NOT ENTITLED TO BENEFITS OF SAFE HARBORS-A
REPORT, 66 Bus. L. 85 (2010) [hereinafter LAW OF PRIVATE PLACEMENTS].
74 See id. at 96 ("Courts generally take the view that investors in private placements
should have such knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that
they are capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective investment.").
75 See Doran v. Petrol. Mgmt. Corp., 545 F.2d 893, 897 (5th Cir. 1977) ("We hold
that in the absence of findings of fact that each offeree had been furnished
information about the issuer that a registration statement would have disclosed or
that each offeree had effective access to such information ... the district court
erred in concluding that the offer was a private placement.").
76 In Securities & Exchange Commission v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119,
125-27 (1953), the Supreme Court, in concluding that the exemption under section
4(2) was not available for Ralston's offering of its securities, stated that the
offerees and purchasers in the transaction "were not shown to have access to the
kind of information which registration would disclose." For a discussion of how
courts have interpreted this statement, see LAW OF PRIVATE PLACEMENTS, supra
note 73, at 103-04.
71 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2012).
78 Id. § 230.147(d) (offerees and purchasers must be a resident of the same state in
which the issuer is incorporated and doing business).
79 The Commission imposes no objection to a wide solicitation, even in cases
where the advertisement reaches across state borders. In such interstate
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sky laws will almost certainly foreclose any broad solicitation, even within
the particular state.80
Facing, as small entrepreneurs do, such difficulties in raising external
capital, the pernicious effects of the loss of or material limitation on the
availability of Rule 504 and Rule 505 are exaggerated. When options are so
severely limited for this vital part of our national economy, any loss of an
opportunity to access external capital in a cost efficient way is important.
To its credit, however, the Commission has mitigated the impact of
state regulation by maintaining a low threshold for "accredited investor"
status. As originally adopted in 1982, an accredited investor included one
with a net worth of one million dollars and included one with an annual
income of $200,000. Those thresholds for accredited investor status
essentially remained unchanged for nearly thirty years.81 During that time,
of course, inflation's impact and other economic forces significantly
increased the number of persons that met one of those standards. What may
be the most vivid way to see the expansionary impact of holding the
accredited investor criteria constant8 2 is to consider data from the Internal
advertisements, however, the advertisement must state that the offering is limited to
the state in which the intrastate offering is made. See, e.g., Securities Act Release
No. 4434, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 2270, 2609 (Dec. 6, 1961); see also Maryland
Inn, SEC No-Action Letter, 1977 SEC No-Act. LEXIS 97 (Jan. 21, 1976)
(interstate newspaper advertisements for a Maryland intrastate offering did render
Rule 147 unavailable); Master Fin., Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, [1999 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 77,560 (May 27, 1999) (the fact that an out-of-
state resident reads or listens to the advertisement for the intrastate offering does
not disqualify the use of Rule 147).
80 The most likely state exemption relied on for an intrastate offering is the small
offering exemption. See, e.g., UNIF. SEC. ACT § 402(b)(9), 7C U.L.A. 106 (2002)
(limiting the offering to ten offerees, although particular states are likely to have
altered the model act provision); see also, e.g., KY REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 292.410(1)(i)(3)(b)-(c) (2010) (limiting the offering to "not more than fifteen
(15) purchasers in Kentucky ... plus an unlimited number of purchasers who are
'accredited investors .).
81 The recently enacted Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010), changed the net worth standards
for an accredited investor by excluding from the net worth calculation "the value of
the primary residence" of the investor. Id. § 413(a), 124 Stat. at 1577 (to be
codified at 15 U.S.C. § 77b). The effect of this is to raise the threshold for one's
accredited investor status under the net worth test of 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(6)
(2012). The Commission recently sought comments regarding its proposed
implementation of this law. See Net Worth Standards for Accredited Investors,
Securities Act Release No. 9177, 76 Fed. Reg. 5307 (proposed Jan. 31, 2011).
82 Another way to look at the impact of holding the accredited investor definition
constant over the time period is in reference to the change in the consumer price
index. For example, SBA data, using 1982-1984 as the base of 100, calculate the
consumer price index for 2008 at 215.2. See U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN., THE STATE
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Revenue Service regarding high income tax returns. Those data show that
in 1982, 169,367 returns with adjusted gross income of $200,000 or more
were filed, which amounted to 0.178% of all returns.83 In 2007, the number
of returns with adjusted gross income of $200,000 or more had grown to
844,535,632, or 3.172% of all returns.
The impact of the Commission's extremely benign neglect is that small
issuers driven to Rule 506 offerings by burdensome state regulatory
schemes have a larger population of potential investors. As described
earlier, small offerings that migrate to Rule 506 must, as a practical matter,
be limited to accredited investors.85 As a result, the Commission's sensible
inaction of allowing the pool of accredited investors to expand makes
perfect sense. It is a rational, if less than perfect, response to the pernicious
effects of state regulation on small business capital formation.
V. THE PRESCRIPTION
A. History of the Problem
State blue sky laws have been the undoing of Regulation D. In order to
offer a sensible remedy for this bad and unintended outcome, it is helpful to
consider the history of the relationship between state and federal regulation
of capital formation.
When Congress enacted the Securities Act, it chose not to preempt state
86
authority over the offer and sale of securities. As a result, a public offering
of securities in fifty states, for example, was obliged to meet the laws and
regulations of fifty-one separate jurisdictions, each with its own
independent, idiosyncratic rules respecting capital formation. This
OF SMALL BuSINESS: A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 2009, 16 tbl. 1.2 (2009)
[hereinafter THE STATE OF SMALL BUSINESS 2009].
83 See Bryan, supra note 52, at 4.
84 See id. Obviously, this IRS data is not a perfect fit for the accredited investor
criteria of Regulation D. The IRS data report all returns with income of $200,000
or more, not distinguishing between single and joint returns. Id. Rule 50 l(a)(6), on
the other hand, defines accredited investor to include a person with "an individual
[annual] income in excess of $200,000 ... [or a] joint income with that person's
spouse in excess of $300,000." 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(6).
85 See supra notes 59-61 and accompanying text.
86 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a, 77r. For a discussion of the history of
the relationship between state and federal regulation of securities offerings, see
Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., An Open Attack on the Nonsense of Blue Sky
Regulation, 10 J. CORP. L. 553, 554-56 (1985); Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., The
Insidious Remnants of State Rules Respecting Capital Formation, 78 WASH. U.
L.Q. 407, 409-11 (2000) [hereinafter Campbell, The Insidious Remnants].
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regulatory result was a wildly expensive, wasteful 87 and multi-faceted
regime that was especially burdensome and unfair for small issuers, since,
as described earlier, small businesses encountered very high relative
transaction costs and generally sought external capital without financial
intermediation.88
In the mid-1990s, Congress began looking at this problem. The result
was the introduction of the Capital Markets Deregulation and Liberalization
Act of 1995 (the Capital Markets Bill),89 which would have preempted
virtually all state authority over the offer and sale of securities. Essentially,
under the Capital Markets Bill as originally introduced, states were left only
with the authority to enforce state antifraud provisions and to regulate
offers and sales of securities offered under the federal intrastate
exemption.90
Not surprisingly, this legislative proposal caught the attention of the
state regulators and their organization, the North American Securities
Administrators Association (NASAA), which offered strong opposition to
the legislation. 91 Importantly, the SEC effectively refused to take a position
on the matter. The testimony and prepared remarks of then-Chairman Levitt
offered during the legislative hearings skillfully dodged any support for
92broad preemption of state authority over securities offerings.
87 In the legislative hearings that led to NSMIA, then-Chairman of the SEC, Arthur
Levitt, stated: "The current system of dual federal-state regulation is not the system
that Congress-or the Commission-would design today if we were creating a new
syster." Capital Markets Deregulation and Liberalization Act of 1995: Hearing on
H.R. 2131 Before the Subcomm. on Telecomms. & Fin. of the H. Comm. on
Commerce, 104th Cong. 105 (1995) [hereinafter Hearing] (statement of Arthur
Levitt). Nonetheless, Chairman Levitt in those hearings refused to endorse a broad
preemption of state authority of securities offerings. See infra note 91 and
accompanying text.88 See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text.
89 H.R. 2131, 104th Cong. (1st Sess. 1995).
90 Section 3(a) of the Capital Markets Bill, id, would have allowed continued state
authority over offerings that were exempt from federal registration requirements
under the intrastate exemption. The intrastate exemption is found at 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(11) (2006).
91 See Hearing, supra note 87 (statement of Dee R. Harris, President, North
American Securities Administrators Association) ("NASAA is opposed to the
preemption of the state authority to register and review securities offerings.").
92 See id.
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As a result, when the bill was finally signed into law as the National
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, the preemption, as originally
proposed, was scaled back dramatically.
93
With regard to offerings under Regulation D, NSMIA preempted state
authority only over Rule 506 offerings. States preserved their rights to
regulate the sale of securities offered under Rule 504 and Rule 505. 94
This was disastrous for Regulation D and the Commission's balanced
regulatory regime. It is the reason that roughly 80% of all offerings that are
eligible to use Rule 504 or Rule 505 are now made, instead, under Rule 506
and limited to accredited investors. Rule 506 became the overwhelming
choice for small issuers to avoid the dreaded clutches of state regulators.
Apparently, however, even this modest amount of preemption did not
sit well with state regulators and those who favor state control over the
registration of securities.
In 2009-thirteen years after NSMIA preempted state authority over
Rule 506 offerings-Senator Christopher Dodd circulated a discussion draft
of an approximately 1100-page bill, then entitled the Restoring American
Financial Stability Act of 2009 (the Financial Stability Bill).95 This bill
would later become the core of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act (the Dodd-Frank Act).96 Buried in Senator
Dodd's discussion draft were two provisions having nothing to do with our
financial crisis but everything to do with small business capital formation.
The provisions were a double-barreled assault on NSMIA's preemption of
state authority over Rule 506 offerings.
93 See Campbell, The Insidious Remnants, supra note 86 (arguing that the impact of
state blue sky laws after NSMIA is both discriminatory against small businesses
and substantively unsound).
94 NSMIA preempts state authority over the registration of "covered securities." 15
U.S.C. § 77r(b)(1)(A) (2006) (amended 2012). "Covered securities" include
securities offered by an issuer pursuant to "Commission rules or regulations issued
under [section 4(2)]." Id. § 77r(b)(4)(D). Rule 506 was enacted under the
Commission's authority in section 4(2). See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(a) (2012).
Securities offered under the exemption provided by section 3(b) of the Securities
Act are not "covered securities" and thus not subject to preemption. 15 U.S.C.
§§ 77c(b), 77r(b)(1)(A). Rule 504 and Rule 505 were enacted under the
Commission's authority in section 3(b). See 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504(a), 230.505(a).
95 Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2009 (Discussion Draft), S.
Comm. on Banking, Hous. & Urban Affairs (2009) [hereinafter Financial Stability
Bill].
96 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-
203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010).
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Section 928 of the Financial Stability Bill would have eliminated
preemption of state authority over Rule 506 offerings. 97 Its impact would
have been significant, especially on small businesses seeking external
capital.
Consider in that regard data from Tables I, III and IV in Part III of this
article. Table I shows that approximately 12,000 Rule 506 offerings are
98 unettypically made each year, and under the Financial Stability Bill all of
those offerings would have become subject to the regulatory regimes of all
fifty states. The impact on small issuers can be seen in Table III and Table
IV. Table III shows that on average small issuers annually make more than
3500 Rule 506 offerings of one million dollars or less.99 Table IV shows
that on average small issuers annually make more than 3000 Rule 506
offerings of one million to five million dollars. 100 In sum, therefore, nearly
7000 small offerings per year would have lost the advantage of preemption
and become subject to the regulatory regimes of fifty separate states.
The second prong of the assault on small business capital formation
was in section 413 of the Financial Stability Bill. It would have required the
Commission to raise both the income standard and net worth standard for
accredited investor status under Regulation D so as to reflect "price
inflation since those figures were determined."' 01 Because the net worth
standard and the accredited investor standard go back to 1982,102 a rule that
applied an inflation multiple to the standards would have significantly
97 The Bill proposed to amend section 18 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77r, by
eliminating securities offered under Rule 506 from inclusion in the definition of
"covered securities." See Financial Stability Bill, supra note 95, § 928.
98 Table I shows that over a 26-month period, there were approximately 25,500
Rule 506 offerings. That amounts to slightly fewer than 1000 Rule 506 offerings
each month, or approximately 12,000 Rule 506 offerings per year. See supra Table
I.
99 Table III shows that over a 26-month period, there were 6196 Rule 506 offerings
of one million dollars or less. That amounts to an average of 238 such offerings
each month, or 2856 such offerings per year. See supra Table III.
100 Table IV shows that over a 26-month period, there were 6487 Rule 506
offerings of one million to five million dollars. That amounts to an average of 250
such offerings each month, or 3000 such offerings per year. See supra Table IV.
101 The language of the bill was the following: "The Commission shall, by rule...
increase the financial threshold for an accredited investor... by calculating an
amount that is greater than the amount in effect on the date of the enactment of this
Act... as the Commission determines is appropriate and in the public interest, in
light of price inflation since those figures were determined." Financial Stability
Bill, supra note 95, § 412(1). The bill went on to require the Commission to "adjust
that threshold not less frequently than once every 5 years." Id. §412(2).
102 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(6)-(7) (1982).
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increased the thresholds and correspondingly reduced the total pool of
investors that meet the criteria.
10 3
Section 413 seemed essentially to be a strategic back-up position
designed to drive small businesses back under state control in the event
Congress chose not to eliminate preemption over Rule 506 offerings. Thus,
even if Congress refused to repeal the preemption over Rule 506 offerings,
increasing the accredited investor thresholds would have effectively limited
the number of accredited investors. With the number of potential investors
significantly limited, it was likely that small businesses would to some
degree abandon Rule 506 and return to the utilization of Rule 504 and Rule
505, thereby subjecting their offerings once again to state regulatory
schemes.
Not surprisingly, commentators immediately concluded that state
regulators, acting through NASAA, were behind these provisions designed
to eliminate the preemption effects of NSMIA.1
0 4
The strategy was formidable. Small provisions were buried in a huge,
complex piece of contentious legislation, making it as a political matter
difficult to eliminate the provisions from the Bill. Also, once again, the
proponents correctly counted on the fact that the Commission would not
interject itself into the legislative fray. The Commission, following the
same path as it took during the NSMIA hearings, offered no support in
favor of continued federal preemption of Rule 506 offerings.
Notwithstanding the formidable legislative strategy of the proponents,
the two proposals originally in sections 928 and 413 of the Financial
Stability Bill essentially were eliminated from the final version of the
Dodd-Frank Act that was signed into law. The Dodd-Frank Act preserved
the preemption of state authority over Rule 506 offerings. 105 With regard to
increasing the thresholds for accredited investor status, the Act made no
103 See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
104 See, e.g., Bill Carleton & Joe Wallin, Dodd's Attack on Angel Financing,
VENTURE BLOG (Mar. 15, 2010, 1:15 PM), http://techflash.com/seattle/2010/03/
congressattack-on angel-financing.html; Broc Romanek, Dodd Bill
Peculiarities: The SEC's Reg D Preemption Gets Hammered,
THECORPORATECOUNSEL.NET (Mar. 23, 2010, 9:09 AM), http://www.the
corporatecounsel.net/Blog/2010/03/an-office-of-investor-advocate.html; Scott
Edward Walker, A Personal Letter to Senator Dodd Regarding His Anti-Angel
Investment Bill, WALKER PLLC (Mar. 31, 2010, 2:53 PM), http://walkercorporate
law.com/angel-issues/a-personal-letter-to-senator-dodd-regarding-his-anti-angel-
investment-bill/.
105 The Act did impose so-called "bad boy" provisions on Regulation D offerings,
which disqualify felons and others engaging in certain types of bad conduct from
using Regulation D. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 926, 124 Stat. 1376, 1851 (2010) (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 77d).
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change in the annual income test but amended the net worth test to exclude
"the value of [the investor's] primary residence."' 0 6 The Act froze the
definition of accredited investor for four years.
10 7
B. Remedial Action(s)
The solution to the Regulation D dilemma is simple to articulate. In
order to restore Regulation D to its appropriate place in the governance of
small business capital formation, state authority over all Regulation D
offerings must be eliminated. What is not so simple, however, is to identify
the rulemaker that is willing to deal with the matter. It is with regard to this
issue that the history of the relationship between state and federal regulators
is important.
There are three possible rulemakers that could eliminate state authority
over capital formation. First, states could surrender their authority over the
registration of securities issued in Regulation D offerings. Second, the
Commission could extend federal preemption through the exercise of its
regulatory power. Third, Congress could extend preemption by the exercise
of its legislative power.
What history demonstrates is that not only will states not surrender their
authority over registration of Regulation D, but also they-more precisely,
state securities regulators-will fight vigorously to expand their authority
over Regulation D offerings and, indeed, over all securities offerings.
History also shows that they are a formidable force, both in terms of their
ability to control legislative outcomes, as they did in the legislation that
became NSMIA, and in their willingness to employ tough political
strategies, as they did with the legislation that became the Dodd-Frank Act.
In short, there is little likelihood that states will ever voluntarily surrender
their authority over Rule 504 and Rule 505 offerings.
The SEC has three options to eliminate state authority over Regulation
D offerings. First, the Commission could amend Rule 504 and Rule 505 by
changing the statutory basis for those rules. Rule 5041°8 and Rule 505109 are
based on section 3(b) of the Securities Act, and NSMIA does not preempt
state authority over securities issued under a regulatory exemption based on
106 Id. § 413, 124 Stat. at 1577. The Commission recently proposed regulations to
implement this statutory change. Net Worth Standards for Accredited Investors,
supra note 81, at 5307.
107 § 413, 124 Stat. at 1577.
'0' 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(a)(3) (2012) (offerings meeting the conditions of Rule 504
are "exempt from the Provisions of section 5 of the Act under section 3(b) of the
Act").
'
09 Id. § 230.505(a) (offerings meeting the conditions of Rule 505 are "exempt from
the provisions of section 5 of the Act under section 3(b) of the Act").
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section 3(b).' 10 NSMIA does, however, preempt state authority over
securities offered or sold in a transaction exempt under "regulations issued
under Section 4(2)."' ' 1 By amending the basis for Rule 504 and Rule 505 to
make them section 4(2) exemptions, state authority would be preempted for
all offerings under Regulation D.
The second option for the Commission would be to use its delegated
authority under NSMIA to expand preemption. NSMIA preempts state
authority over offerings of "covered securities," which include securities
offered or sold to "qualified purchasers, as defined by the Commission."',
12
The broad breadth of the Commission's authority to define "qualified
purchasers" is made clear by the language of the statute itself, which limits
the Commission's authority only by requiring that the definition be
"consistent with the public interest and the protection of investors."" 3
Defining "qualified purchasers" to include purchasers of securities under
Rule 504 and Rule 505 would meet the "public interest" criterion, since
NSMIA itself requires the Commission, when acting in the public interest,
to give due consideration to "capital formation."
'
"
14
The final option for the Commission would be to petition Congress for
an expansion of NSMIA's scope to include preemption over securities
issued under regulations enacted under section 3(b) of the Securities Act.''
Regrettably, history shows an unwillingness on the part of the
Commission to act in regard to expanding preemption of state authority
over registrations. In both the legislative actions leading to NSMIA and to
the Dodd-Frank Act, the Commission failed to advocate in favor of
preemption.
While one may be sympathetic with the Commission's reluctance to
oppose state regulators-its partners in the battle against securities
..O See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(a)-(b) (2006).
... See id. § 77r(b)(4)(D) (amended 2012).
112 See id. § 77r(b)(3).
113 Id.
1"4 Section 77b(b) requires that "[w]henever... the Commission engages in
rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is.. . in the
public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in addition to the protection of
investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition, and capital
formation." Id. § 77b(b).
115 This would be the preferred solution, since it would also preempt state authority
over Regulation A offerings. See Campbell, supra note 53, at 106-10 (discussing
the impact of blue sky laws on the availability of the exemption provided by
Regulation A).
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fraud 6-the Commission's inaction has facilitated the severe damage done
to Regulation D by blue sky laws and the actions of state regulators.
Not only has this inaction hurt small businesses, exacerbating their
economic and structural disadvantages in the capital markets, but also the
inaction seems inconsistent with the congressional delegation of authority
under NSMIA. Congress in NSMIA expressed a clear preference for
regulations that balance investor protection with the promotion of capital
formation and expressly authorized the Commission to expand preemption
by regulation." 7 It is difficult, at least for me, to conclude that the
Commission, in failing to act to expand preemption, is acting reasonably
with regard to its delegated authority under NSMIA. It has the authority to
act by regulation to bring investor protection and promotion of capital
formation back into balance, yet it refuses to act.
Little can be said about the willingness of the third rulemaker,
Congress, to expand preemption. Congress's taste for preemption seems to
blow with the political winds, and it is difficult enough to understand the
political winds of today, let alone predict the winds of the future. What is
clear, however, is that the simplest and most efficient remedy here is a
congressional remedy-a revision in NSMIA to take states entirely out of
the regulation of the registration of securities.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Regulation D, the Commission crafted sensible exemptions from the
registration requirements of the Securities Act. The regulation provided
rules that appropriately and efficiently balanced the need for efficient
capital formation with the need to protect investors, a balance that was later
confirmed as obligatory by federal legislation. Regulation D specifically
addressed the special capital formation needs of small businesses, a large
and vital part of our national economy.
State blue sky laws, however, wrecked Regulation D. The data
presented in this article demonstrate that entrepreneurs attempting to raise
relatively small amounts of capital generally fail to avail themselves of the
Regulation D rules specifically designed to meet their special situation.
116 In a prior article, I wrote about the reluctance of the Commission to expand
preemption by regulation. Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Blue Sky Laws and the
Recent Congressional Preemption Failure, 22 J. CORP. L. 175 (1997). Without
expressing an opinion as to the actual motivation of the Commission, I offered
various explanations for the Commission's inaction (e.g., fear of exceeding its
delegated authority; preference for state rules over its own; failure to recognize the
hegemonic realignment effected by NSMIA). Id. at 207-09.
117 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
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It now falls to the Commission or Congress to take steps to remedy this
situation and reclaim Regulation D.
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